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Book Reviews
LAW AN PsYCHOLOoY IN CONFLICr. By James Marshall. Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill, 1966. Pp. 119. $5.95.
Mr. Marshall has collected and explained a series of psychological studies
that "scientifically" indicate the unreliability of witnesses' perception, recollection, and articulation of observed events. They are interesting. None of the conclusions reached is seriously questioned by psychologists. Many of the conclusions
may be unknown to persons of legal training, and most of them should be considered by legal experts who are modifying the "rules of evidence." To know
that scientific evidence buttresses reasons for or against a rule is to be more certain, of the wisdom of its application.
In addition to describing these studies, Mr. Marshall asserts that more
scientific research would be helpful, particularly on the problem of developing
legal techniques to avoid the distortions now prevalent in testimony. Most persons in the legal profession would probably agree that there is a need for joint
iesearch by lawyers and social scientists as to the reliability of evidence which
depends upon observation and recollection.
It is unfortunate that the foregoing ideas should be distorted and buried
in an incredibly poor analysis. Mr. Marshall confuses his reader and does a disservice to efforts to reform evidence law with a morass of overstatements and
overgeneralizations as well as misstatements of the purpose of the "rules of evidence." At page eight he reveals the basic thesis of his book when he states,
"the assumption that witnesses can see accurately, hear accurately, and recall
accurately ... which is the keystone 'As If' of the law of evidence, is in fact contradicted by the findings of psychological science." At page forty he asserts that
the psychological studies revealing inaccuracies in testimony makes more acute
the need "for a complete reconsideration of the rules of evidence to conform
them overall instead of piece-meal to what we know of the human condition."
Marshall's incorrect notion that the "rules of evidence" are based upon a belief in the accuracy of witnesses' testimony is what leads him to raise a hue and
cry for a total revamping of the entire law of evidence.
Wigmore gives a wholly different perspective:
Our system of Evidence is . . . based on experience of human naturte .... That human nature is represented in the witnesses, the counsel,
and the jurors. All three, in their weaknesses, have been kept in mind by
the law of Evidence. The multifold untrustworthinesses of witnesses; the
constant partisan zeal, the lurking chicanery, the needless unpreparedness, of counsel; the crude reasoning, the strong irrational emotions, the
testimonial inexperience, of jurors,--all these elements have been considered. Tens of thousands of trials have forced them out into the open,
(169)
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where thousands of judges have observed them; and their observations
have profited by them, in thinking out principles and formulating rules.
All this has not been created out of nothing; it rested on a solid
basis of experience in human nature at trials. And that human nature has
not essentially changed ...
...And there will always have to be some apparatus for testing and
checking those weaknesses. We can expect to improve the apparatus, but
not to ignore the weaknesses. And just as long as man continues to be a
reasoning animal, and to desire to profit in his narrow personal task by
the combined experience of others, just so long will trial judges crave and
devise generalized rules for making some headway through the welter of
lies and errors and doubts and inferences that is heaped up before them
at a trial.'
The trial itself and the calling of various witnesses exist because of the long
recognized fact of unreliability of a witness's testimony. The rules of evidence are
largely rules of exclusion which do not permit the introduction of certain testimony because it is thought to be especially untrustworthy or confusing to a jury.
The general value of the scientific studies that Mr. Marshall has collected is that
they tend to prove that the development of the law of evidence has been sound
as a whole, i.e., it does conform overall to what is scientifically known of the
human condition. Mr. Marshall has asserted that the converse is true because
he does not understand that the basic rules of evidence are exclusionary and that
the reasons for each exclusionary rule and its exceptions have been based on observations of unreliability in thousands of trials.
The need for reforms in the law of evidence is certainly well accepted. Current controversy concerns how to do it. Significant practical value from psychological studies can come only in the "scientific" validation or rejection of the reasons
for the rules. This requires piecemeal application of particularized results to each
specific rule of evidence to ascertain whether that rule does achieve its underlying
purpose of furthering the reliability of evidence. Law and Psychology in Confliat
may have been titled differently and would have been a much more worthwhile
book had Mr. Marshall addressed himself to that task.
JOAN M. KRAusKOPF*
DECADE OF FEAR: SENATOR AND CIVIL LIBERTIES. By Donald

J. Kemper. Columbia:

The University of Missouri Press. 1965. Pp. xi, 252. $5.95.
Somewhere Professor Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., has suggested that the measure
of a period is best taken in one of its secondary, rather than its frontline, figures.
Through either coincidence or design, Father Donald J. Kemper of the Newman
Center of Missouri University has followed the suggestion and has reviewed the
constitutional impact of the Cold War between 1950 and 1960 in terms of the
career and public philosophy of the late Thomas Carey Hennings, Jr. There is
also a subtheme in his book: the Hennings tragedy.
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
1. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 8c at 262 (3d ed. 1940).
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Or perhaps one might say, the two Hennings tragedies. The first was the
Senator's untimely death at the age of fifty-seven. The other was the fact that
when he died he fitted the Schlesinger formula by being a secondary figure of his
times. Yet one of the last eulogies to him-a few brief and elegant remarks by
John F. Kennedy in the closing days of 1960-doubtless prompted some to reflect that, had the thread of fate been twisted just a little differently, the late
Senator from Missouri rather than the Senator from Massachusetts might have
stood at the threshold of the presidency. And certainly, had anyone been asked
at the beginning of 1935 to speculate on the presidential possibilities of the new
members of the Missouri delegation to Congress, he probably would have given
the young prosecutor from St. Louis an equal chance with the county judge
from Independence.
But whatever the imponderables of politics, certainly Tom Hennings faced
them with an abundance of political assets. Most obvious were athletic good
looks, that indefinable quality which theatre people call "presence," a warm baritone voice, and a sense of timing tailor-made for political debate. There were
others. Listed in the Social Register, Hennings' easy but reserved affability
and long-time political activity made him at home in all sections of St. Louis
life. Grandson of one of the largest slaveowners in Georgia, he was a strong proponent of civil rights legislation long before the cause obtained popularity. And
above all, there was an instinct of courtesy in the most literal sense, an ability
to be suaviter in modo, fortiter in re, or, as the New York Times put it, to be
"a fighter who had the respect of his opponents." Certainly the endowment paid
off handsomely in a political career which won every election undertaken and
which carried him to the United States Senate. Yet for all of this, there was a gap
between promise and fulfillment. Perhaps it was a case of too much too soon,
of everything coming too easily and bringing a set of problems and frustrations

of its own.
However, Father Kemper writes essentially as a political scientist rather than
a biographer, and with obvious regret passes over much biographical material
to focus on his basic theme-that the transition of Hennings "from a hesitant
spokesman for civil liberties in the House to an aggressive defender of individual
iights in the Senate" affords a unique point of view to explore the constitutional
controversies of the Cold War. The theme is then unfolded in three interrelated
topics: the Hennings subcommittee on constitutional rights, the Senator's defense
of the Supreme Court, and his several passes-at-arms with the late Senator McCarthy.
The successive dashes between Hennings and McCarthy constitute the
most dramatic and spectacular part of the book, for the two men seemed to
have star-crossed careers. They came to the Senate within two years of each
other, and both died in office after approximately a decade of service. They first
crossed swords in the closing days of Hennings' initial senatorial campaign and
had repeated confrontations through their years of common Senate service. Less
vivid, but perhaps more significant historically, was Hennings' defense of the
traditional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The work, or perhaps just the in-
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stitution, of the subcommittee on constitutional rights was certainly least productive in immediate terms, but was possibly the most fruitful in the long run.
These in brief are the three strands of the study. They are developed in research
which includes not only the conventional sources, but personal interviews as well,
and are expressed in a journalistic style.
If the book is to be criticized, it is not for what it contains but what it does
not. On a purely editorial note, the collation of court cases in the bibliography

would have been the better for a brief statement as to the holding in each. More
regrettable substantively is the virtual omission of what both ally and opponent
in the Senate pronounced as Hennings' finest hour-his sustained exegesis of
law and history in upholding the historic powers of the presidency in the conduct of foreign affairs against a proposed constitutional amendment which would
limit their range and scope. In its way the amendment was also a product of the
Cold War, proposing to expand Congressional power at the expense of the presidency and thus complementing the suggestions for an amplified Congressional

check upon the Supreme Court. To both proposals the Missouri Senator rose in
opposition, defending what he liked to call the "living checks of the three departments."
Fittingly, the most moving testimonial has come from those who opposed
him. Particularly noteworthy are the comments of Senator Dirksen, who resubmitted the so-called Bricker Amendment less than an hour before he spoke at the
Hennings memorial proceedings and who recalled the earlier struggle over that
proposal in his remarks:
Of all the scholarly, documented speeches that were made on that
subject, probably none was more profound than that of Tom Hennings.
... He was convinced that my position was wrong. I was convinced that
his position was wrong. But he advanced his cause like the great warrior he was....
That is how I shall remember Tom Hennings

. . .

big in body and

heart, amiable and patient, energetic and dedicated, friendly and scrupulously fair, always courteous, ever courageous. He was indeed a happy
warrior.
To be sure, Father Kemper does touch on the decisive role Hennings played
in preserving the historic boundaries of the presidential powers. But this is done
only by way of the anecdotal illustration that after carrying off the laurels of a
hard-fought victory won by the narrowest of margins, Hennings was met by prearrangement by a group of newspapermen who were expecting an interview in
depth and who were completely nonplussed when the Senator chatted briefly- and
-then, courteously but firmly, excused himself.
Perhaps better than anyone else, however, the incident epitomized the cornplex combination of characteristics which came to its end in September of 1960
amid eulogies ranging as far afield as the London Timer. Yet for all the.eulogies,
the historical judgment on Senator Hennings would have to be the scriptural injunction that to whom much is given, much is expected, and by such standard,
his accomplishment fell short of his talent. There is a terse rejoinder to this,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol32/iss1/15
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Whose does not? There is also a longer one-that Senator Hennings did leave a
memorial of distinction. His was the emphasis on the continuing relevance of the
Bill of Rights, the impetus to the struggle against corrupt electoral practices and
juvenile delinquency, the freedom of information (indeed, shortly before these
lines were written, President Johnson signed into law the statute which Hennings
had forcefully urged during his lifetime), and above all, a renewal of the tradition of civility-that it is possible to disagree without being disagreeable.
Happily, it is in this tradition that Father Kemper writes, for while the
author's views and values are apparent, he manages to turn out a history of a
turbulent and controversial decade which on the whole is a study rather than a
polemic. Future students of the period, particularly those interested in political
science and constitutional law, will find it of value; friends and admirers of the
Senator will esteem it; and, quite apart from his own involvement, Tom Hennings would have liked it.
GmA T. DUNNE*

*Member of The Missouri Bar.
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